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SUMMARY 
Respondents Chevron and Salt Lake County have filed briefs in 
reply to Appellant Sandy City. The theme of both briefs is that 
the Utah statutes, County ordinances, and rules of procedure and 
evidence, which form the basis of this appeal, do not apply to 
them. They hope, through such posture, to acquire the narrowest 
possible review. 
Respondent's arguments are not valid. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that these allegations may cause confusion or distraction 
from the real issues before the Court. For this reason, the City 
has prepared this reply. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A statement of the facts relevant to this appeal has 
previously been provided. Those facts remain unrefuted. However, 
Chevron has noted that some facts were not referenced to the 
record. A supplemental reference is included as Appendix "A" to 
this reply. With that accomplished, each factual allegation by the 
City is unrefuted and has been directly referenced to the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHEVRON AND SALT LAKE COUNTY MISCONSTRUE THE STATE 
STATUTE WHICH RESTRICTS UNINCORPORATED "URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT." SUCH CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE REJECTED BY 
THE COURT 
A. THE PRINCIPLE MEANS BY WHICH CHEVRON AND THE COUNTY 
MISCONSTRUE THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE IS THROUGH FICTION. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON THESE 
FICTIONS, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN DISPELLED HAD DISCOVERY AND TRIAL 
PROCESSES BEEN PERMITTED TO PROCEED. 
1 
The Chevron and County briefs contain a common distracting 
dimension -- the repeated reliance upon fiction. The resort to 
fiction does not just color the briefs -- it is their central 
element upon which all their arguments rest. 
The fictions posed by these parties are of two principle 
types: those which construe specific facts and those which 
characterize processes. The following are examples of fictions 
which have been suggested as factual: 
Fiction No. 1 - That Only the Chevron Phase of Development is 
the Subject of this Action. Respondents claim that "Sandy had 
undertaken no suit against McDonalds" at the time summary judgment 
was granted. Their inference is that a McDonalds Restaurant --
the second phase of the development --is outside the scope of this 
appeal. 
The 4.18 acre development consists of multiple phases. They 
include the following: 
Percent of Total 
Phase Acres Development 
Chevron .70 17% 
McDonalds 1.30 31% 
Other Phases 2.18 52% 
Totals 4.18 100% 
All of the foregoing property, which constitutes the Chevron, 
McDonalds and subsequent development phases, is described as part 
of the development in the City's Verified Complaint. B e s i d e s 
Chevron brief, p. 19 
2
 R4 
2 
Chevron and McDonalds, a bank, medical office building, and 
additional commercial development have been planned. 
The District Court never considered the full scope of the 
development. Its Memorandum Decision evidences its belief that 
Chevron and McDonalds were the only development phases. In fact, 
they were less than one-half of the full project. 
McDonalds was not named in this action because it was not a 
property owner. Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot were the property 
owners of the entire development at the time summary judgment 
motions were heard. They are, accordingly, named in this action. 
The City has kept McDonalds informed of this action in the 
District Court. McDonalds has not chosen to intervene or to 
contest the City's factual allegations in this action. McDonalds' 
absence is by its own choice -- it does not diminish the scope of 
development here under review. 
Fiction No. 2 - That "Sandy's own evidence" shows the Costs 
of the Chevron Phase to be Less than $750,000. The County contends 
that all evidence consistently shows the Chevron phase to be less 
than $750,000 in total costs. That assertion is wrong. The MAI 
Administrative evidence, envelope 6 #21. A copy of this 
plan appears as Exhibit "B" to this brief. 
4
 R261, para, (d). 
Counsel for McDonalds is Fabian & Clendenin. See mailing 
certificates at R154, 172, 284 
After hearing on summary judgment in this action, McDonalds 
acquired ownership to a portion of the development property. An 
action was then initiated against McDonalds (Case No. C88-03898). 
No determination has yet been made in that action. 
3 
appraisal submitted by the City estimated costs of that phase at 
$660,000 to $760,000. This range assumes the land "value" to be 
•7 
$210,000. However, according to Chevron officials, the actual 
o 
"costs" of the land were apparently much higher. 
Even without the admission by Chevron officials, there is at 
least a factual issue whether first phase exceeds the $750,000 
urban development restriction. 
Fiction No. 3 - That to Enforce the Urban Development Statute 
Would be Impossible for the County. Respondents contend that it 
would have been impossible for the County to have projected costs 
for the entire development in determining whether the $750,000 
urban development restriction should apply. They allege that the 
County has no authority to consider the development as a whole and 
Q 
no way to estimate prospective development costs. This contention 
is misleading in two obvious respects. 
First, the Urban Development Statute (10-2-418) expressly 
obligates the County to estimate costs for "all phases" of the 
development. Utah Code Section 57-5-3 contains additional 
7
 R133-135 (Appraisal, Appendix "A," p. 23) 
R108 (Testimony of Sam Jones). 
o 
County brief, p. 19. 
authority -- and perhaps obligations -- for planning commission 
review of this entire development prior to its subdivision. 
Second, it is practical for the County to estimate the cost 
of a development prior to actual construction. This is especially 
true in this case, since the scope of the Development was planned 
and known prior to commercial zoning. 
County staff had no problem in concluding that the development 
l P 
would exceed $750,000. Sandy City was also able to estimate full 
development costs -- certified by an MAI appraiser. Salt Lake 
County maintains, by statute, one of the largest real estate 
appraisal staffs in the state. The County has the capacity to 
estimate the cost or value of any property within its boundaries 
and the authority to require sworn statements by property owners 
as to such value. 
It is ludicrous for the County to assert that, under such 
circumstances, it could not have estimated whether this development 
would exceed $750,000. The problem here is not that the County 
Emphasis added. Salt Lake County contends that Section 
17-27-27 renders this section ineffective by defining "subdivision" 
to exclude "commercial" development. However, that definition 
expressly only applies to Title 17. Section 17-27-22 requires 
that more stringent regulations under other statutes govern. 
Envelope 6 #21 and envelope 4 #4 (Appraisal, p.5). 
1 *? 
Rill (Testimony of County Development Services Director). 
1 3
 Utah Code Ann. 59-2-301, et seq. 
1C
* Utah Code Ann. 59-2-306. 
5 
lacked the resources to meet its statutory obligations -- but that 
it did not even try. 
Fiction No. 4 - That Salt Lake County is Not Required to 
Comply with the Filing Requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
as are Other Parties. Partially through the Summary Judgment 
hearing, Salt Lake County presented affidavits certifying a 
voluminous administrative record to the Court. The evidence was 
received by the Court over repeated City objections and was 
relied upon in granting summary judgment to respondents. 
The County acknowledges that these affidavits were not filed 
ten days before hearing as required by Rules 6(d) and 56(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But it contends that these rules 
apply only to "affidavits" and not to "certifications." The County 
also argues that "public records" are exempt from timeliness rules 
because the public can review them at any time. 
The County's distinction between "affidavits" and 
"certifications" is a fiction without substance and is irrelevant. 
The County records were in fact certified by "affidavit." Even 
legal counsel for the county characterized their "certifications" 
1 7 
as "affidavits" before the District Court. 
The County argument for a "public record" exception to the 
rules of procedure is also a fiction. The rules do not permit such 
1 5
 T21-30, 74-75. 
County brief, p. 15. 
1 7
 T21 
6 
exc?? 
A p-"rvy opposing* so>'^ motion needs nc*;.f^ ot win'-h e\ .deno,- a 
mo*•!:"•: r ~' ' y is relying on in order to prepare present coun ter 
evidence and argument. 
When the County submitted ; '- - stackr -f ^vjrent? 3t the 
heari i lg, ' without stipulation -^  • >i ^," -^tv-^ « the 
City " " The County posed no reason why : '.'...;. < -t-td 
its massive evidence ::n^iv u i Ui : tr notion. 
^r,-< hr«-\ M:~ conclusion" • .ts 
Memorani.1..:: Decision //itho'^ i-rLyin. o: ~ ne document;- v.... "i::e 
] 9 
r.r-iPt-y suhir-t'ted in viola1. :••:. ' • iies. Si immary judgment 
B. CHEVRON AND THE COUNTY MISCONSTRUE THE "URBAN DEVELOPMENT" 
STATUTE BY A SECOND MEANS -- THROUGH SEGMENTATION -- ITSELF A TYPE 
OF FICTION. THIS DEVICE ARTIFICIALLY CAUSES THE CHEVRON PROJECT 
TO BE CONSTRUED IN THE ABSENCE OF ITS COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT. 
THIS DEVICE MISLED THE DISTRICT COURT AND SHOULD BE REJECTED ON 
APPEAL. 
i <-• j f .• .. - - * j he 
construction j v i r i 'f * i !. y ^11 ejements ^r tiiis aft ion o'.rsicie of 
a re>vn:r i:: ; ~~^ r.i<~.to 'y^fnvt. The misleading nature of such 
segment nt.; ..:. . .• o\_t:Iii led a:- Lows: 
1 Segmentation of Ownership. CI levron says that it "1 leld 
an interest in a portion" of the development- -n-l * l: it i t h^d ''no 
interest i r ^nv development other t1,::" •;.•-• ; the •• [•-•n 
l
 •
 !;
 T27-28 
! 9
 City brief, . '-> 
7 
station." That oblique reference to ownership, outside of any 
time-context, attempts to segment ownership of the project and to 
distance the Chevron phase from the development as a whole. 
In fact, Chevron did not own the parcel at the time the 
conditional use permit was approved. It was owned in common by 
respondents Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot -- the joint developers 
of the entire tract. Chevron did not acquire ownership of the 
parcel until approximately five months after the conditional use 
p | 
permit was approved. Motions for summary judgment had been heard 
one month prior to conveyance to Chevron. Chevron impliedly admits 
that it did not acquire control over the design and development of 
pp 
its station until that time. 
Prior to legal action, the County's attorney conceded "if it 
is one development, the boundary commission law concerning the 
half-mile would be applicable, even though it might be in different 
ownership." But, even without that admission, there is no 
evidence to support Chevron's contention that its project was 
separate due to separate ownership. The property was in one 
ownership and it should be considered as a whole to determine if 
the $750,000 urban development restriction was violated. 
Chevron Brief, pp. 6-7. 
R343. See also, envelope 4, #3. 
Chevron Brief, p. 18. 
Envelope 5 #6, p. 2. 
8 
2 . Segmentation of the Land under Development. " :.- • -ij •r 3 
shows that t.he property subject of ihir action i.? proposed a-- a 
'N '--r.^- ' • . •:^ \;--- - * "-. '"'m< The value of the ] and far exceeds 
$73C , • ' • : ! v,r^vron concedes tlia. t tl ie:i it: : osts .-  z 
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•" , •
 s
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was platted separately frcr; the balance of t.he subdivision or -hat 
the land was conveyed s^pc^pr-*]- r
 f--^r *-'•
 c,
'T'ar*; -iudgmerr . ; the 
contrary,, the owners o. - . . ..
 r ,..,-.,, , ,,. x,,,,,_ , ; t 
* ^ ' « 
?r> 1 1 • i • -"'. ' • referenced appraisal :c included : :: the 
administrative evidence and •-» suim-*'*. ! no 1 ud^-d a- Sxd-ic-* '" to 
this brief. 
Mievron Brief, ^ :"-•!. 
:
'
l/
 Id. 
9 
they would be the sole developers of the project and that all 
construction would proceed as a single development. 
While asserting a fiction segmentation of the development, 
respondents ignore undisputed evidence before the Court that, at 
the time summary judgment was heard, the Chevron station was part 
of a unified parcel, under one ownership, and under the control of 
a single developer. 
3. Segmentation of the Chevron Project Itself. Just as 
there are phases of a subdivision development, there are phases of 
an individual project. The term "phases of development" is 
commonly used to include both "land acquisition" and 
"construction." The statutory definition of "urban development" 
includes "all" of these "phases." Since the definition is 
clear, and not wholly beyond reason, it should be applied in 
accordance with its literal wording. 
Trying to limbo under the $750,000 urban development 
restriction, respondents pretend that "all phases" of their 
development means construction of the building "shell" only. Such 
a segmentation would exclude many true costs of a finished 
2 8
 R245. 
See City Brief, pp. 4-6. 
30 
Such usage employed in Summary of Utah Real Property Law, 
Reuben Clark Law School, Vol". II," 1987", p. 511. 
31 
Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
(1967). 
3 2
 Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449,451 
10 
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roadway dedications ; et-_:. 
Th^ r^ -'-T-i =h<~-w - that Chevron ^ - * * .-.M - < •- .-rvnBh ^nti jely 
f i: om 1:1 le $ 1 / 5 , 000 f :i g i i:i: e posed 1 : ;; t] - < ' *• i r 
pro]er u * However, there is reason to believe that just the costs 
o' fh—-r—. <- ^ '^^.-, '-*' *b^:r trn v~ -a*H y-.umps, will exceed the 
' *; drtf n i b e Chevron s project without such costs is t? in-i !ine 
a service ytaiiun WJL;' •:* ~;-;n n •:?r ^ tanks r*u:r" '^  an 
automatic car wash withou t plumbing or a bay. ;. .. • m-<gina*::ons 
are of convenience and should be rejected by the court. 
4 - Segmentation of the Development Process. ' " 'T -ban 
Development statute rrab^r- i+~ unlawful for the County +•• 'pr:iv t;" 
'nopr^v^" uiip/i development as defirod by statute. Respondents 
<' -.•''*. ' '' ' * ~: ' *» ;; ODei : s on this 
property M. i :.; cuiis ti i:ute approval because conditi.or.a_ use 
permits were also required. 
;: 5::S
 Envelope 3 #16-1 and 16-2. 
6<*
 R 2 4 7 
11 
Zoning and use approvals on this development were not a series 
of unrelated events. They are stages of a process -- an "approval" 
process . The development process commonly includes acquiring 
zoning as a condition to land acquisition. 
Respondent Yeates was the property owner, applicant for 
zoning, and developer of the property. He requested and received 
commercial zoning by the County in the month preceding application 
for the Chevron conditional use permit. He applied for a use 
permit for the McDonalds phase approximately one month later. He 
appeared at all zoning and conditional use hearings as a principle 
advocate of all phases of the development. 
The property owners' entire development was laid out and 
presented to the County at the time commercial zoning was 
requested. Plainly, zoning of the property was a critical and 
proximate element of the county approval process. Without the 
first step, no development could have proceeded. 
Respondents attempt to segment zoning approvals from the 
balance of the development approval process is transparent tactic 
Both Chevron and the County refer to the processing of 
zoning applications as approvals. Chevron brief, p. 5; County 
brief, p. 8. 
This case is typical in that subdividers must often secure 
rezoning to make a project feasible. Purchase agreements between 
the developer and land seller are commonly subject to this 
condition. Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Brigham Young 
University Legal Studies, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Vol. II, p. 
513. 
3 7
 Envelope 6 #21. Also Exhibit "B" to this brief. 
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to RTV * J I t i s 
misleading .*: d ".;i , ,-i b? i ejected. 
5. Segmentation m inc AnnexaLion Process Unincorporated 
urban development is restricted by stat*:'^ • ; .:;---. ry 
is "wi'-.ii^-' annex. Tha- willingness is manifest thread the 
fo] ] o] / • * ' V annex"* ; *-". n^cess: 
a. Through a public hearing process, the city adopts a 
Policy Declaration which states specifically what areas the 
City is willing to annex; 
b. If an annexation petition is received, t„n? ^.y 
adopts a resolution accepting the annexation petitior ;''*' 
c. The City holdr. .1 | M 11 • f 1 • li^nMiiq < • 11 I Ii^  ••" • n 
petition; and 
d. The Cizy ado* 
of annexation. 
T 1 . . • i 1 • • • • ' h e 
area of th- :'i-y • Policy Declaration. There, the Ci'y n-js seated 
it is v ; 1 *•* a *- ^  a > - -• -v " h ^  . -npp >~- * * **' • '; "i'f^ialr; r 1 a v - nade 
other -xi • •- • . ,--.- . e 
property/* ' ii-.-w^ voi , because the developers of this project nave 
not petitioned r - •• annexation, furtl ler formal d^-1 arations by the 
City are procea-i: ai.. 7 inappropriate and unneceis? = y. 
Section iO-2-411. ,Ti Vr. r-.-jn Ann ] 953 
Section in-2-j.tlJ, .-..:., ,.: A m 1, 3 953 
Secti-'n h' ,. 411 Uta;; Code -nn. 1953 
1 .>
 P , 
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Still, respondents pretend that the City must declare more 
annexation willingness. They argue that the annexation process has 
nothing to do with this action and that the City must show its 
willingness to annex through some other means. 
Respondents' argument rests on two fatal flaws. First, the 
urban development statute (10-2-418) does not require any 
"declaration" of willingness by the City. It speaks instead to 
property owners -- if they want to develop, they must show that 
they have attempted to annex. 
Second, urban development statute is integral to the 
annexation laws of our state -- not independent from it. It is 
part of the state annexation act and its purpose is to encourage 
annexation of "all of the urbanized unincorporated areas contiguous 
to municipalities." 4 
Arguments which fictionalize statutory obligations and which 
artificially segment annexation policies and processes, are 
misleading and should be rejected. 
POINT II 
CHEVRON AND THE COUNTY ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE RULES 
OF EVIDENCE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE WHICH APPLY TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENTS. THEIR MEANS IS TO POSIT AN OVERLY-RESTRICTIVE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE COUNTY EXCEEDED 
ITS LAWFUL JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE, THE "ARBITRARY OR 
CAPRICIOUS" STANDARD POSED BY RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE USED 
TO RESTRICT APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. BECAUSE SALT LAKE COUNTY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO APPROVE 
DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACTIONS WERE UNLAWFUL AND THE "ARBITRARY OR 
CAPRICIOUS" STANDARD DOES NOT APPLY. 
€%i
* Section 10-2-401(5), Utah Code Ann. 1953 
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The Coi m t y M V ; ; • 3 
a c r e d e v e l o p m e n t ear.:vM: •;<* o i ; e s t i ^ m ~ - i u r l e s s t h o s e a p p r o v a l ^ v;°re 
"a::i :bi t i \ai ^  < : n - : - . "M?> b i - - ro :v; t ! " - y ^ e s u r r p t i T o f 
a d m i n i s i r a i . v e ; e a s o : i r . o i e n e s s , r e s p -i l '>\;*,. nope \„ ^ o n : ; : : .- \ n e 
Coi i r t t h a t summary j u d g m e n t v/as j u s t i f i e d , d e s p i t e o b v i o u s i s s u e s 
: • ; .• - • -+- ^~\\*~tr do p^rmi+~ ' - ^ u n t i e s t o u s e r e a s o n a b l e 
mean?- 4 i r-*.n ^•"•r.t s p e c i f i c g r a n t s of a u t h o r i t y * su : a : - e s , 
- . -- - y 
a c : r i c \< ^ i* conf" : . . : w i t h s u p e i i o i 1 HV» OI a i - - i . : e e m p t e u ; , , s t a t e 
p o l i c y , t ]!*=""-'"'• ^:-:i "1 ; ,r :M- t p rerump 1 . i c* ' r e a s o n a b l en? s s . 
j \ e , s •• - -. * " * - •; - : o 
not ": S t a t e v . Hutchinson'* ' ' , t h e f o r e m o s t r a s e ^n x- w-^ s .- ••; ^ t ah 
l o c a l g^v^" , i ^ i v : ^ . i ' ^ "T* r.h Q ! i p r n ' np r\Mi> t- r1 r rna r i z e d t h e s c o p e o f 
r e v i e w : .. •*:• " —* \ - ^ j i - i i * • • • :*' i-
A I M ~he rrourr.K- -•;: i I :v' interfere with the legislative 
choice of the means selected unless it is arbitrary, or 
is directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the 
policy of, the state or federal laws or the constitution 
r\-f +-]T-I c Qf-qf» r^-r of th^ United States 
:\-^  C- n t liar :: ^:<i ci^ir tlMt: f~i i:he arbitrary/capricious 
t musi oe established f-.nt the Coi m t y ' s acti on is 
consistent ;J :L statp statute and p.c .:<... In Peatross v. Board of 
1
" * C o u n t y b r i e f, p . 1 3 . 
' 11,1 i i 1.1 i i i (] 98 :: ). 
At. p. 1126, Emphasis added. To conflict with existing 
state law means "permitting that expressly prohibited by statute, 
or forbidding that expressly permitted by statute." Redwood Gym 
v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Utah 1981). 
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County Commissioners, the principle case relied on by the County, 
the Court confirmed that the arbitrary/capricious standard only 
applies if the County was acting lawfully: 
"The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is the 
authority to review the actions or judgments of an 
inferior tribunal upon the record made in that tribunal 
and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or judgment. 
Correlated to this is the principle that ordinarily where 
the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of its 
authority, conducted a hearing and arrived at a decision, 
the reviewing court will examine only the certified 
records; and will not interfere with the matters of 
discretion or upset the actions of the lower tribunal 
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess 
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside of 
reason the ^action must be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Thus, the arbitrary/capricious test applies only where the 
"reasonableness" of a discretionary action is the sole question. 
It has no application where the County lacks authority to act. 
The County and its planning commission are agencies of limited 
jurisdiction. Their "authority" is dependent entirely upon the 
terms of the statutes reposing power in them. They cannot confer 
jurisdiction on themselves. If the mandatory provisions of their 
enabling statutes are not met, they have no authority to proceed. 
The Urban Development Statute (10-2-418) limits the County's 
jurisdiction territorially as well as in subject matter. That 
statute forbids the County to "approve or permit" urban development 
*
8
 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). Naylor v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 398 P.2d 27 (Utah 1965), the case relied on by 
Chevron, does not support application of the "arbitrary or 
capricious" standard in this case, because in Naylor,the statutory 
authority of the City was not in question. At p. 28. 
r
*
9
 At p. 284 [Emphasis added]. 
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wi r::: o n^-h •• -. _ * i 3 
prohibit the '! -r.ty from r^j-ji vinq use permits which cent racii - > the 
mastei p] an. 
The heart of I .he City's pieadinj i. tr- .^ega;:,i .nc 
County officials "exceeded their jurisdJction" as defined by *his 
r • * • - - * : ; * d * ; "Tiax' JL: " <~- , 
• •* i.-v "natt.es •';, nK-;«-- adn-. n, str at \ ve -.ns^ietion and the 
prpren?*--- j an arbitrary or capricious standard has no place before 
th.i s i \ HI i l 
B. BECAUSE THE ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS STANDARD DOES NOT APPLY, 
IT CANNOT BE USED TO CIRCUMVENT APPLICABLE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
he 
arbitiary/cap uiour, standard ~s -\&-\ :• * , -' ih: create a 
formidal !'^  -":• ' i 3le?/ Mr/', r t a n d a : d ' ' -e^ -i^ -v -* n r r ^ a ] . 
Secoi :. ^ ,
 t ; -- - -, . • was 
justified, despite obvious issuer2 o: nan erial fact. 
r,
'vv;e is not a more 4r^ Ltant issu^ hnf-yo *irv - ^ r 4 +b ' the 
unlawful i ise of governmental power. H;-. - KU :»:-:• c: ..v. ;e:: e - "f 
Civil Procedure serve as judicial tools to check si ich excesses of 
pow^r. r|1= - ""niiteu J """ :'; t h e s e cri~"*cal 
m e a s u r e s , v -; -nlai-t^ their s t a t u t o r y ^ H I:,:JL-:C:.',!1. oy appli <" :v. ion 
o 4 ar i n a p p r o p r i a l o i^viow s t a n d a r d . 
.**'•*; _ :" ,;'- '* )••]•*-• \:? t r a t e s t h a t 
Salt hake d-Juiity h:v. ;iisdLctl.>n tc A p p r o v e ther.o d e v e l o p m e n t s . 
R -I ^  h ij'. . S e e t o o t f K > t e '' > ,i  t I > I I 11 < * n u mm ;i i y i • n111 a i n < *«I in 
Exhibit "C" of this brief. 
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That appraisal is not contradicted in the evidence. Accordingly, 
there exists a "genuine issue of material fact" sufficient to 
preclude summary judgment on these critical jurisdictional issues. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COUNTY ACTED WITHIN ITS LAWFUL 
AUTHORITY IN APPROVING THIS DEVELOPMENT, SUCH APPROVALS 
ARE INVALID EVEN UNDER THE "ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS" 
REVIEW STANDARD POSED BY RESPONDENTS 
The City's pleadings allege that even if the County had not 
exceeded its jurisdiction, it nevertheless abused its discretion. 
This is because the County's decisions to grant development permits 
were not based on competent evidence. 
Of course, technical rules of evidence need not be applied in 
proceedings in administrative proceedings. However, 
administrative agencies are not wholly unrestricted. Although they 
may consider some informal testimony, a residuum of competent legal 
evidence must support their findings. 
The County's brief has outlined the supposed "evidence" upon 
which the County based its decisions. That evidence shows a 
o x
 Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 681 P. 2d 1224, 
1226 (Ut. 1984) 
C O 
Utah Courts have held that the "residuum rule" applies to 
a broad range of agency proceedings. Hackford v. Industrial 
Commission, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P. 2d 899, 901~~(1961); Lack Shore 
Motor Coach Lines Inc. v. Welling (Public Service Commission), 9 
Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1959); Sandy State Bank v. 
Brimhall (Commissioner of Financial Institutions), 636 P.2d 481, 
486 (1981); Kehl v. Schwendiman (Office of Drivers License 
Services), 735~P.2d 413, 415 (Utah App. 1987); Yacht Club, supra, 
(Liquor Control Commission). 
County brief, p. 6. 
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complete lack of any "residuum of competent legal evidence" in the 
following particulars: 
1. Nature and Scope of the Development. The County 
apparently concluded that the Chevron phase was distinct from the 
balance of the development. Yet, the application for change of 
zoning of the 4.18 acre tract described the tract as a single 
development -- a "commercial subdivision." Businesses occupying 
that subdivision are referred to as "tenants." Although each 
tenant has control of its own operation, the developer maintains 
control of the entire development and of its "homogeneity of 
theme."5* 
Chevron agents made unsworn statements before the County 
Planning Commission. None of these statements contradicted the 
description of the development contained in the zoning application. 
The Developer, Delyn Yeates, did suddenly allege that the property 
was going to be developed by two developers. However, he offered 
no elaboration or explanation of what he meant. Further, his 
statement was later contradicted by citizens testifying before the 
County Commission that Developer Yeates "promised that he would be 
the developer of the whole project and not piece meal like has 
happened before."56 
R100 
Rill. 
R245 (Testimony of Pam Delehanty). 
19 
54 
55 
56 
2. Costs of the Development. The County Director of 
Development Services, testifying before the Planning Commission, 
confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will exceed 
the $750,000 figure."57 Chevron officials, testifying at that same 
hearing, confirmed that their costs for just the first two pads was 
$760,000.58 A later MAI appraisal showed that the costs of the 
entire development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban 
59 
development restriction. 
3. Compliance with the Master Plan. The application for 
rezoning of the 4.18 acre development confirmed that "current land 
use plan shows rural residential for this property." County 
staff and City officials both told the Planning Commission that 
commercial use of this property was inconsistent with the Master 
Plan.G1 No evidence was introduced before the Planning Commission 
to show commercial uses to be consistent with the intent of the 
master plan as required by County ordinances or that the master 
plan had somehow expired as now contended by respondents. 
4. City Willingness to Annex. City officials confirmed to 
the County Planning Commission that the proposed development was 
5 7
 Rill 
5 8
 R108. 
5 9
 R133-135 
6 0
 R100 
G 1
 R23, 114, 165. 
6 2
 R22. 
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within the City's Annexation Policy Declaration Area and that 
"Sandy City is willing to annex this territory." No evidence was 
introduced before the Commission to contradict this testimony. 
Therefore, there was no basis upon which to conclude that the City 
was unwilling to annex. 
5. Public Safety and Interests. Some residents have 
G S GG 
described the development as desireable, some as not. No one 
with credentialed competence testified of traffic or other public 
G7 
safety impacts or of the economic needs of the area. 
The record places the development squarely within the 
restrictions of the urban development statute and in contradiction 
to the County's master plan. Plainly, the Planning Commission did 
not consider the full scope and costs of the development, as 
required by state law. Acting outside of one's legal authority is 
the epitome of arbitrary and capricious action. 
The County also failed to comply with their own ordinances 
which require "evidence" that the development complies with the 
intent of the Master Plan and that the public interests will be 
served. The evidence demonstrates noncompliance with the Master 
6 3
 R023. 
6
* R109. 
6 5
 R109, 110, 115. 
G G
 R108-109, 163. 
£7 
The attorney for Chevron did allege that there was a need 
for a service station but claimed no expertise and presented no 
facts in support of that contention. R113. 
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Plan. Respondents attempted to construe the ordinances as merely 
guidelines and presented no evidence of Master Plan compliance. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the failure of an agency 
of government to conform its official actions to its own 
regulations is arbitrary and capricious. The Court has said: 
"Defendants contend that the procedural rules are merely 
'guidelines,' but administrative regulations are presumed to 
be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored by the agency 
to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary 
and capricious action. Without compelling grounds for not 
following its rules, an agency must be held to them." 
The County's failure to require evidence of compliance with 
state statutes and county ordinances, in the face of clear evidence 
of noncompliance, was the essence of capriciousness and is the 
direct cause of this otherwise unnecessary legal action. 
POINT IV 
MUCH OF THE CHEVRON AND COUNTY BRIEFS CONSIST OF ARGUMENT 
OF WHAT THE LAW SHOULD BE RATHER THAN WHAT IT IS. 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THOSE ARGUMENTS 
WOULD DO CRITICAL DAMAGE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR STATE. 
A. TO PERMIT THE COUNTY TO IGNORE ITS MASTER PLAN WITHOUT 
ADOPTION OF A NEW PLAN OR EVEN RUDIMENTARY INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACTS 
OF DEVELOPMENT ON NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES RISKS SERIOUS DAMAGE TO 
OUR STATE. 
Uses of land, such as those of Chevron, which do not conform 
to the comprehensive zoning plan of the community, have been a 
source of deep concern to legislators and planners. These 
nonconforming uses limit the effectiveness of land-use controls and 
0 0
 R100, 165 
[Emphasis added]. State, Etc. v. Utah Merit System 
Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Ut. 1980) 
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share responsibility for the blight which has infected many urban 
areas.70 Municipal attorneys, urban planners, and law review 
commentators73 agree that nonconforming uses imperil the success 
of the community plan and injure property values. 
These generally-recognized policies are precisely why the 
legislative body of the County has prohibited by ordinance, uses 
which do not conform to the comprehensive plan of the County. That 
legislative act is equally binding on Chevron and all other 
nonconforming uses in the County. The ordinance is not subject to 
"variance" or alteration by the Planning Commission or the courts 
of this state. 
B. MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IS THE PRINCIPLE MEANS OF DEVELOPMENT IN 
OUR STATE. TO PERMIT LARGE SCALE UNINCORPORATED DEVELOPMENT ALONG 
CITY BORDERS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS STATE LEGISLATIVE POLICY AND 
RETARDS GENERAL GROWTH BY RESTRICTING THE EXTENSION OF MUNICIPAL 
SERVICES. 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Second Edition, Volume 
1, p. 357. 
71 
Messer, Non-conforming Uses, Municipalities and the Law in 
Action, p. 347 (1951). 
72 
Lewis, A New Zoning Plan for the District of Columbia, p. 
112 (1956). 
73 
Comment, 7 Baylor Law Review, p. 73 (1955); Comment, 102 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 91 (1953); Comment, 1 
Buffalo Law Review, p. 286 (1952); Comment, 9 University of Chicago 
Law Review, p. 477 (1942); Mendelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming 
Use; Judicial Restriction on the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 Drake Law 
Review, p. 23 (1958); Norton, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses and 
Structures, 20 Law & Contemporary Problems, p. 305 (1955); 
O'Reilly, The Nonconforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23 
Georgetown Law Journal, p. 218 (1935); Young, Regulation and 
Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 Western Reserve Law Review, p. 
681 (1961); Summary of Utah Law: Land Use, Zoning and Eminent 
Domain, BYU Journal of Legal Studies (1979), p. 151. 23 
Growth of development is critical to the economic welfare of 
our state. The state legislature has long recognized that the 
means by which development occurs is through the expansion of City 
boundaries. Through this means, vital services are brought to 
areas of growth potential or undergoing development impact. 
Because City services follow municipal annexation, actions 
which block the growth of City boundaries also retard municipal 
service delivery. Generally, where such services are stopped, 
orderly growth cannot occur. 
Salt Lake County has long sponsored commercial development in 
unincorporated areas, along the borders of cities and in 
unincorporated islands. Although the County has received tax 
benefits, cities have suffered as commercial developers avail 
themselves of lower County development standards and still utilize 
municipal services along City borders. 
Because a city cannot annex so as to leave an island of 
unincorporated area, these commercial developments, which resist 
annexation, restrict annexation along the entire length of a city 
boundary. 
In order to avoid damage to development from such practices, 
the state legislature has prohibited the County from approving 
urban development within one-half mile of a city boundary. The 
City respectfully submits that if that explicit restriction is not 
honored, in its express terms, city growth throughout our state 
will be severely retarded, as Counties are then encouraged to 
24 
compete with Cities for tax base. When City growth is halted, so 
also is full municipal service delivery to many developing areas. 
CONCLUSION 
Chevron and County have attempted to avoid state statutes, 
county ordinances, and the rules of procedure and evidence. Those 
efforts lack legal foundation. Further, genuine issues of material 
fact are glaring. Important legal rulings require adequate 
factual development. Discovery is the appropriate means to resolve 
issues of fact. For reasons both practical and legal, summary 
judgment should be vacated in order that basic discovery may 
proceed. 
DATED this Ofl ' day of November, 1988. 
uu. n /JLLL 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Statement of Facts 
(Including Supplemental References) 
The facts as appear unrefuted of record in this action are as 
follows: 
The Parties and their Interests 
1. Sandy City is a Utah municipality created to provide 
urban governmental services essential for sound urban development 
and for the protection of public health, safety and welfare in 
residential, commercial and industrial areas, and in areas 
undergoing development. R2 and Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401(2) (1979) 
2. Defendants Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot, Postero-Blecker 
("Property Owners"), are property owners and developers of a parcel 
of unincorporated territory ( the "Property") which lies within 
one-half mile of Sandy City limits and within territory the City 
has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration. 
R3, 10-11 
3. Defendant Salt Lake County ("County") is a subdivision 
of the state of Utah, organized and functioning under authority of 
Title 17 of the Utah Code, and located in Salt Lake County. 
Defendant County Planning Commission is a commission appointed by 
the County and operating under authority of Chapter 27, Title 17, 
of the Utah Code. R3 
4. Defendants Chevron and Postero-Blecker are Pennsylvania 
and Arizona corporations, respectively, doing business in the state 
of Utah. R3 
1 
The Property and Its Authorized Uses 
5. This action involves a single parcel of approximately 
4.18 acres of commercial property ("Property") located on the 
northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300 East, in unincorporated 
Salt Lake County ("County"). R4 The Property immediately abuts 
the municipal boundaries of Sandy City ("City"), and is located 
within an unincorporated "island" within the limits of the City. 
6. Since its adoption in 1976, the County Master Plan for 
the area has called for Rural Residential uses on the Property. 
R100, 165 Sandy City plans also specify similar such uses. The 
Property has historically been zoned Residential (R-1-8) consistent 
with both City and County plans. R100, 102 
7. On August 5, 1987, at the request of the property owner, 
the County amended its zoning to permit commercial development 
(Commercial C-2 and Residential RM/zc) on the Property. R18-19, 
102-103 The County master plan was not amended to account for this 
change. For this and other reasons, the City objected to the 
rezoning. R17 
8. The City has adopted an Annexation Policy Declaration 
under authority of state statute. Rll, 30-34 The purpose of this 
Policy is to declare the areas which the City is willing to annex. 
The Property is within the area projected for expansion under that 
Policy Declaration. R34, T30 The effect of the Policy Declaration 
is to prohibit County approval of commercial development in excess 
of $750,000 on the Property, unless the Property Owners have first 
2 
attempted to annex. Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1979) The Property 
Owners have not attempted to annex. Rll 
The Owners' Development Activities 
9. In 1987, the Property Owners purchased the Property with 
express intention to develop a "commercial subdivision." R162 The 
evidence is undisputed that the land value alone exceeds $850,000. 
R108, 111, 133-135 
10. The Owners' development is in fact a multiphased 
"commercial subdivision." R162, 164 It's first phase is a Chevron 
Service Complex and the second phase a McDonalds Restaurant. There 
are also other phases of development on the property, the specifics 
of which have not been disclosed by the Property Owners. However, 
costs of development in all phases will run to millions dollars. 
R133-135 
11. There was substantial neighborhood resistance to their 
development. R108, 163, 165 The Owners made concessions to 
residential neighbors in order to minimize opposition. R110, 246 
One concession was that the Owners would be the sole developers of 
the project and that all construction would proceed as a single 
development. R245 The owners were successful at overcoming some 
County and community resistance through this and other means. R115 
12. On August 26, 1987, Defendant Postero-Blecker, on behalf 
of Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a Conditional Use 
Permit for construction on approximately .7 acres of the Property. 
R20 Such a permit is required by Salt Lake County ordinances for 
commercial development within this zone. R21-22A Such ordinances 
3 
require that permit applications be made by the "owners" of the 
Property. R21 Neither Postero-Blecker nor Chevron was the owner 
of the property at the time of application or consideration by the 
District Court. R245, 285, 343, T75-76 
13. The proposed project was a service station, convenience 
store and car wash. R107, 181 The Postero-Blecker application 
placed the value of the development at $250,000. R20 However, 
uncontroverted evidence before the District Court showed the actual 
value of the .7 acre of land alone, to be $200,000 to $210,000. 
The costs of improvements are an additional $450,000 to $550,000. 
That total cost range of $650,000 to $760,000, did not include land 
values or improvement costs for the McDonalds Restaurant or any 
other projects on the remaining 3.48 acres of the Property. R108, 
111, 133-135, 246-247 
14. On about September 30, 1987 (approximately one month 
after the Chevron application), the Property Owners, through their 
agent, filed a second application for a conditional use. R168 
This application was for a "McDonald's Restaurant" to be located 
on the Property adjacent to and immediately to the north of the 
Chevron Center. R168 McDonalds was not owner of the property at 
the time of their applications or at any time prior to initiation 
of this action. R114, 133-135, 247, 285, 308, 343, T75-76 
15. The application for this second (McDonalds) phase 
specified the value of the project, including land, to be $300,000. 
$168 However, the evidence before the County showed the stand 
4 
alone costs of the second phase to be $900,000 to $1,100,000. 
R133-135 
County Approval of Phases One and Two 
16. On October 13, 1987, the County Planning Commission 
approved the conditional use application for the first (Chevron) 
phase, over objection by the City. R115 On October 14, 1987, 
Sandy City appealed that decision to the Salt Lake County 
Commission. R27 
17. On October 21, 1988, the County Commission denied the 
City's request for appeal and upheld the Planning Commission 
decision. The County Commission also entered findings of fact over 
written objection by the City. 
18. On October 27, 1987, the County Planning Commission 
approved the use application for the second (McDonalds) phase. 
R167 The City appealed that approval to the County Commission on 
November 4, 1987. On December 9, 1987, the County Commission 
denied the City's appeal and approved the conditional use 
application. R249 
Disposition in the District Court 
19. On November 6, 1987, Sandy City filed a verified 
complaint in Third District Court to require compliance with the 
foregoing requirements. R2 By letter dated November 19, 1987, the 
City Attorney inquired of counsel for the Owners, of a convenient 
date for deposition of Owner Yeates. Defendant's counsel did not 
respond to that inquiry. R202 However, Answers to the complaint 
5 
were filed by the defendants in December 1987 and January 1988. 
R49, 56, 63 
20. Motions for summary judgment were filed by all defendants 
in January, 1988. R75, 125, 155 On January 26, 1988, the City 
responded with its own motion for summary judgment. R151 Motions 
by the City and Chevron were accompanied by affidavits and 
memoranda. R133, 136-150, 159-168, 78-117 The City filed a Motion 
to Strike certain portions of defendant's affidavits and other 
documents and filed an affidavit of counsel evidencing the need for 
additional discovery time. R173-178, 198-206 
21. On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the motions for 
summary judgment and Motion to Strike. R118, 122, 127, 169 
Counter affidavits were filed by the City on the day prior to the 
hearing. R185-188 In addition, during the hearing, Defendant Salt 
Lake County submitted numerous documents to the court, without 
prior notice to the City. The County evidence was received by the 
Court over oral objection by the City and without inquiry as to 
"good cause". T21-30, 74-75 
22. On February 25, 1988, Salt Lake County filed a Motion 
for Certification of the Record which it had filed with the Court 
at the hearing on summary judgment, together with supplemental 
related documents, which motion was granted. R255-258 
23. On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum Decision 
denying the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike 
and granting defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake 
County's Motion for Certification. R259-263 On April 8, 1988, the 
6 
Court entered its formal Order and Judgment of Dismissal, which 
order forms the basis of this appeal. R265 
24. On April 28, 1988, the City filed a Motion for Injunction 
During Pendency of Appeal. R334 The motion was based in part on 
affidavits showing that comprehensive development was occurring on 
the entire Property and that the Property Owners had conveyed the 
property to Chevron and McDonalds after the motions for summary 
judgment had been heard. R324, 327 That motion was denied and the 
affidavits ordered stricken. R339 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
SUBJECT: 
LOCATION: 
HIGHEST AND BEST USE: 
As Vacant-
As Proposed -
SIZE: 
PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS; 
ZONING: 
OWNER OF RECORD: 
APPRAISED INTEREST: 
DATE OF APPRAISAL: 
4.64 acre raw ground, proposed 
convenience store and fast food 
restaurant. 
NWC of 10600 South 1300 East, Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
Convenience store/gasoline 
sales/car wash and fast food 
restaurant facilities. 
Same as vacant use. 
4.64 acre Total raw land area 
Chevron - 30,260 square feet with 
170 feet frontage along 10600 South 
and 178 feet of frontage along 13 00 
East Street. 
McDonald's - 54,885 square feet 
with 295 feet of frontage along 
1300 East Street. 
850 to 900 square foot range for 
the Chevron convenience store and 
3,367 square feet for the 
McDonald's restaurant. 
C-2 and RM/zc 
Steven E. Smoot; K. Delyn Yates; R. 
Scott Priest; W. Scott Kjar (4.39 
acres) 
Dry Creek Reservoir & Irrigation 
Company (.25 acres) 
Fee Simple Title 
December 2, 1987 
VALUATION CONCLUSIONS 
Raw Land Value 4.64 acres 
Raw Land Value 3 0,2 60 s.f. 
(proposed Chevron site) 
Raw Land Value 54,885 s.f 
(proposed McDonald's site) 
Cost of Chevron Improvements 
(includes land value) 
$900,000 
$210,000 
$275,000 
$660,000 to $760,000 (range) 
Cost of McDonald's Improvemnts $900,000 to $1,100,000 (range) 
(includes land value; does not include franchise fees) 
GARY FREE AND ASSOCIATES 
